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The Chemical Events Working Group of the Global Health Security Initiative has developed a flexible screening tool
for chemicals that present a risk when accidentally or deliberately released into the atmosphere. The tool is generic,
semi-quantitative, independent of site, situation and scenario, encompasses all chemical hazards (toxicity,
flammability and reactivity), and can be easily and quickly implemented by non-subject matter experts using freely
available, authoritative information. Public health practitioners and planners can use the screening tool to assist
them in directing their activities in each of the five stages of the disaster management cycle.
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The Global Health Security Initiative (GHSI) is an informal
network of countries that came together shortly after the
September 11, 2001 attacks, to ensure exchange and coord-
ination of practices within the health sector in confronting
new threats and risks to global health posed by terrorism.
Delegations of the GHSI include Canada, France, Germany,
Italy, Japan, Mexico, the United Kingdom, the United States
and the European Commission. The World Health
Organization (WHO) serves as an observer. The principal
purpose of the GHSI is to strengthen global health pre-
paredness and response to threats of biological, chemical
and radio-nuclear terrorism and pandemic influenza. This
document, written by the Chemical Events Working Group
(CEWG) of the GHSI, recognizes that chemicals, despite
conferring many benefits, may pose significant acute and
chronic health risks in the event of an accidental or
deliberate release. The public health impact of such an* Correspondence: david.russell@hpa.org.uk
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reproduction in any medium, provided the orevent is potentially catastrophic. Therefore, it is vital
that emergency planning be developed at local, regional,
national and international levels to effectively manage
and mitigate chemical releases. Because of the mil-
lions of distinct chemicals, it is not realistic to plan
and prepare for all chemicals. Risk must be prioritized
so that the chemicals of greatest concern provide the
basis for subsequent prevention, emergency planning
and preparedness, detection and alert, response and
recovery activities.
The world of chemicals
The chemical industry is one of the world’s largest
economic sectors, producing organic and inorganic
chemicals, plastics, synthetic fibres, pharmaceuticals
and medicines, synthetic rubber, soaps, paints and coatings,
pesticides, fertilizers and other agricultural chemicals [1].
In 2010 worldwide chemical sales were valued at
2,353 billion euros. China was the largest chemical
producer (€575.3 billion), followed by the United States
(€395.2 billion), Japan (€152.7 billion) and Germany
(€141.6 billion). In the European Union, the chemical
industry directly accounted for 1.1 percent of total gross
domestic production and employed 1,157,000 persons [2].Ltd. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
iginal work is properly cited.
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Chemical Abstracts Service (CAS) had assigned Registry
Numbers (RN) to 66,515,886 distinct organic and inorganic
substances. The CAS Online Chemical Catalogues File
(CHEMCATS) contained listings of more than 19,000,000
commercially available chemicals and their worldwide
suppliers [3]. These commercially available chemicals are
produced in quantities ranging from milligrams to millions
of metric tons. High production volume (HPV) chemicals,
as defined by the Organization of Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD), are those chemicals produced
or imported into OECD countries in excess of 1,000 metric
tons per year. In 2007, 4637 chemicals were classified as
HPV chemicals [4]. Examples of HPV chemicals produced
in excess of 5 million metric tons in 2010 are given in
Table 1 [1].
The World Health Organization (WHO) describes a
chemical incident as the uncontrolled release of a chemical,
resulting in (potential) harm to public health and the
environment. Chemical incidents can arise from human
activities and from natural sources (e.g., volcanic eruption,
earthquake, forest fire) [5]. Chemical incidents, resulting
from human activity, can be accidental or deliberate.
Accidental releases can occur at any location in the
production, use, storage, disposal or transportation
cycle of the chemical. Examples of accidental chemical
incidents that resulted in immediate significant deaths,
injuries and property and/or environmental damage
are listed in Table 2. These incidents, especially the 1976
release of dioxin at Seveso, greatly influenced national and
international regulations, with respect to the amounts of
chemicals that could be stored in a given location, land
use provisions and transport regulations [5-9].
In addition to their legitimate use in industry, agriculture
and medicine, chemicals have been used in warfare, by
insurgents and terrorists. The direct use of chemicals,
especially chlorine, phosgene and sulphur mustard, in
World War 1 caused 91,198 deaths and 1,205,655 non-
fatal injuries [10]. Since World War 1 additional chemical
warfare agents, including the organophosphorus G series
(e.g., sarin, soman, tabun) and V series (e.g., VX) of nerve
agents have been developed. Sulphur mustard was used
in the Iran-Iraq War of 1980–88, causing over 20,000
casualties [11]. The Chemical Weapons Convention
(CWC), in effect since 1997, prohibits the use of chemicalTable 1 Examples of HPV chemicals [1]
Organic
chemicals
Inorganic
chemicals
Plastics Fertilizers
benzene chlorine polyethylene ammonia
ethylene sodium carbonate polypropylene ammonium nitrate
methanol sodium hydroxide polystyrene phosphate rock
propylene sulphuric acid polyvinyl chloride phosphoric acidwarfare agents, restricts the quantity that signatories may
hold for research purposes and requires signatories to
destroy existing stockpiles [12].
Deliberate chemical incidents occur when terrorists
release a chemical in order to kill or injure humans or
animals, to destroy crops or to cause extreme economic
or environmental damage. Deliberate releases can occur
at locations within the production, use, storage, disposal
or transportation cycle of the chemical but also at totally
unexpected locations. Terrorists have used reactive
(explosive), flammable and toxic chemicals in their attacks.
Transportation systems, especially subways and commuter
rail lines, have been the principal targets as these afford
easy access, have minimal security and are used by large
numbers of people with luggage, bags and packages
[13-15]. In 1994 Aum Shinrikyo became the first terrorist
group to produce and use the nerve agent sarin when it re-
leased sarin outdoors in the city of Matsumoto, killing 7 in-
dividuals and injuring 262. In March 1995 Aum again
released sarin, this time in the Tokyo subway, killing 12 in-
dividuals and causing 5,498 to seek medical attention [16].
Chemicals that consumers can purchase for home use,
such as acids and alkalis, cleaners and pesticides are of
concern. Hydrogen sulphide, which is produced by
mixing readily available household chemicals [17], and
phosphine, which is released by the action of water on
phosphide fumigants and rodenticides (e.g., aluminium
phosphide, zinc phosphide) [18,19], are widely used in
suicides. The rodenticide, tetramethylene disulphotetramine
(TETS), has been implicated in several homicides [20]. The
inclusion of toxic chemicals as ingredients in food,
beverages and consumer products continues to cause
deaths and serious injuries (e.g., contaminated cooking
oil [21], diethylene glycol in medications [5,22] and
melamine in milk powder [23]).
Scoping the problem
As shown above, chemicals are produced, used, stored,
disposed of and transported widely and have the potential
to harm the health of the public as a consequence of both
acute and chronic health effects. Therefore, it is essential
that countries develop emergency plans and prepare for
chemical incidents at the local, regional, national and inter-
national level. Prioritization of risk is essential if resources
are to be used efficiently. Hazards must be identified, risks
prioritized and risk reduction strategies developed. Having
a well-developed plan for risk prioritization and risk
reduction can help adapt and focus preparedness efforts
on chemicals of greatest concern for a given jurisdiction
and ultimately, reduce casualties and hasten recovery [5].
Development of a screening tool
The CEWG developed the following screening tool to
prioritize the risk posed by the accidental or deliberate
Table 2 Examples of chemical incidents resulting in regulatory actions
Accident
location
Date Type of event Consequences Actions Ref.
Nypro UK Ltd,
Flixborough, UK
1 Jun
1974
Explosion and fire – release of 30
tonnes of cyclohexane resulting in
a vapour cloud explosion
28 killed; 89 injured, damage for
several km
Influenced Seveso 1 content [6,7,34]
Led to the UK Health & Safety
at Work Act & establishment
of UK Health & Safety Executive
Hoffmann
LaRoche,
Seveso, Italy
10 Jul
1976
Runaway thermal reaction – toxic and
corrosive chemical cloud formed,
containing phenols, sodium hydroxide,
and ~2 kg of 2,3,7,8-tetrachlorodibenzo-
p-dioxin (TCDD)
Over 5,700 residents evacuated;
220,000 people under medical
surveillance; 447 cases of skin lesions
or chloracne; >3000 animals dead;
80,000 animals slaughtered; affected
a 18 sq km area; 20 billion lire paid
in compensation
Led to Seveso 1 Directive [5-7]
Union Carbide
India Ltd,
Bhopal, India
3 Dec
1984
Runaway reaction – 30–40 tonnes of
methyl isocyanate released which
drifted over a crowded working class
neighbourhood; no warning for people
within the area surrounding the plant
2,500-6,000 deaths; >200,000 injured;
>50,000 survivors experiencing chronic
ailments such as pulmonary fibrosis,
bronchial asthma, chronic obstructive
pulmonary disease, emphysema,
recurrent chest infections, keratopathy
and corneal opacities
Led to changes in Seveso I
thresholds and proximity to
residential populations, influenced
land use planning provisions
[5-7,
31,32]
Led to USA Emergency Planning
& Community Right to Know
Act & CMA CAER Program
Sandoz, Basel,
Switzerland
1 Nov
1986
Warehouse fire – 30 tonnes of
chemicals released into air and water
(dinitro-ortho-cresol, organochlorines,
organophosphates, ~150 kg mercury)
Massive contamination of the Rhine,
500,000 fish killed; pollution travelled
over 500 km
Extended Seveso I to include
storage activities
[6,7]
Phillips 66
Co, Pasadena,
Texas, USA
23 Oct
1989
Explosion and fire – high density
polyethylene production – release
of >85,000 lbs of highly flammable
process gases
23 deaths; more than 130 injured;
over $1 billion in losses
Triggered 1990 USA Clean Air
Act & Risk Management Program
(RMP) & Process Safety Management
(PSM) process standards
[6,34]
SE Fireworks,
Enschede, The
Netherlands
13 May
2000
Explosion and fire – 177 tonnes of
fireworks exploded
22 killed; 947 injured; 2000 homes
destroyed
Led to changes to definition
of explosives in Seveso II
[5-7]
Aurul S.A., Baia
Mara, Romania
30 Jan
2000
Breach in tailings dam – 100,000 m3
of cyanide rich tailings (cyanide plus
heavy metals including copper) released
into rivers feeding Danube and Black Sea
Contamination of water supply at 24
locations affecting 250,000 people;
massive fish kill; destruction of aquatic
species; pollution of ~ 200 km of
river basin
Extended application of Seveso II [6,7]
Grande Paroisse,
Toulouse, France
21 Sep
2001
Explosion and fire – 300–400 tonnes
of downgraded ammonium nitrate
30 deaths; 2,242 injured (20 seriously),
5,079 treated for stress; 25,000 homes
damaged; 5 schools destroyed; 1,000
factories damaged; toxic chemicals
leaked into river
Changed application of Seveso II
with respect to ammonium nitrate
[5-7]
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consistent with the following WHO statements that:
1. A release of a gas or aerosol into the atmosphere,
resulting in an inhalational exposure, is likely to
cause the maximum number of casualties [5]
2. Chemical incidents can cause injury through four
basic injury mechanisms (fire, explosion, toxicity and
the experience of traumatic events) [5]
The tool is semi-quantitative, independent of site, situ-
ation and scenario and encompasses all chemical hazards
(toxicity, flammability and reactivity). CEWG considered it
essential that the tool be easily and quickly implemented by
non-subject matter experts using freely available, authorita-
tive information. Chemical warfare agents and industrial
chemicals (HPV, specialty, pharmaceuticals and pesticides)have been considered but toxins, even if they could be
synthesized, have not.
Definition of risk
Risk is defined as the likelihood of harm occurring. CEWG
used the definition of risk given in the Global Harmonized
System of the Classification and Labelling of Chemicals [24].
This definition is general, not dependent on a particular
scenario or situation and encompasses all chemical hazards.
Risk ¼ severityof hazardð Þ  probabilityof exposureð Þ ð1Þ
Determining severity of hazard
Hazard by definition refers to an inherent property of an
object, place or situation that makes it potentially dan-
gerous. In the context of chemicals, it is the degree of a
chemical’s capacity to harm by interfering with normal
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corrode, produce toxicological effects, etc. Hazard is an
intrinsic property of the chemical that cannot be
modified. Chemical hazards are usually divided into
three categories: toxicity, flammability and reactivity,
all of which can be quantified [25]. Some chemicals
can present more than one hazard, e.g. hydrogen sulphide
is both toxic and flammable [24].
The severity of hazard is defined as the maximum hazard
posed by the chemical.
Severity of hazard ¼ maximum hazard posed by the chemicalð Þ
ð2Þ
For toxic chemicals, airborne releases can result in both
inhalational and dermal exposures. Since inhalational
exposures would most likely cause the maximum number
of casualties [5], acute inhalation toxicity can be used as
the toxicity parameter. When available, Acute Exposure
Guidelines (AEGLs), developed by the United States
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), were used as the
acute toxicity parameter. AEGLs represent threshold
airborne exposure limits that are protective of public
health and are applicable to emergency exposure periods
ranging from 10 minutes to 8 hours. The AEGL-3, which
is defined as the airborne concentration of a substance
above which it is predicted that the general population,
including susceptible individuals, could experience
life-threatening health effects or death, was selected as
the measure of the toxicity hazard [26]. When an
AEGL-3 value was not available a Protective Action
Criteria (PAC) value, developed by the United States
Department of Energy, was used [27]. Several different
toxicity scoring schemes [24,28,29] were considered
before the one given in Table 3 was agreed upon.
CEWG used the United States National Fire Protection
Association (NFPA) criteria and scoring for flammability
and reactivity hazards [30].
The maximum hazard posed by a chemical is based on
the highest score it received in one of the three hazard cat-
egories (inhalational toxicity, flammability and reactivity).
The severity of hazard classes and scoring are given in
Table 4.
This approach to determining severity of hazard is very
informative as all hazards posed by a given chemical are
clearly indicated. It is also flexible in that users can focus
on a specific hazard category (e.g., inhalational toxicity) if
they so desire.
Determining probability of exposure
The ease of release, either accidentally or deliberately, and
the availability of the chemical can be used to estimate the
probability of exposure [28,29].Probability of exposure ¼ ease of releaseð Þ  availabilityð Þ
ð3Þ
Airborne releases have the potential to cause massive
casualties as once the chemical is released it has the
potential to spread over a large area with little or no
warning. Furthermore, unlike contaminated manufactured
food or consumer products, airborne releases have zero
possibility of recall. The Bhopal incident is an extreme
example of casualties caused by a large airborne release of a
toxic chemical [5,31,32]. The release of a highly flammable
vapour cloud resulted in the explosions and fires in the
Flixborough [6,33] and Pasadena Phillips 66 incidents [6,34].
Since the ease of creating an airborne release is directly
related to the vapour pressure of the chemical, vapour
pressure can be used as an indicator of ease of release.
Criteria and scoring for determining the ease of airborne
release of a chemical, which are similar to those used in
ITF-25 [28], are given in Table 5.
As a general rule, the greater the availability of the
chemical, the more likely it will be involved in a chemical
release event [35]. Consequently, chemicals that are widely
produced, used, stored or transported are more likely to be
involved in releases than those that have limited or special-
ized use. HPV chemicals are most readily available in large
quantities. Many other commercially available chemicals
have wide use but in much more limited quantities.
For many potential deliberate release scenarios using
toxic chemicals, the quantity of chemical required to
successfully execute the scenario is modest, ranging
from grams to 100 kilograms, especially if the release is
in a confined space. Terrorists most likely will choose to
use readily available toxic, flammable or explosive
chemicals or those that can be easily produced from readily
available chemicals [36]. However, terrorists may choose to
use synthesized or imported chemical warfare agents [16].
Criteria for determining the availability of chemicals
are given in Table 6. The criteria are situationally inde-
pendent as the general availability of the chemical rather
than its availability in a specific location is considered.
CEWG suggests that public health authorities undertake
a detailed determination of all chemicals produced, used,
stored, disposed of or transported through their area of
responsibility so that the actual local/regional availability
of the chemicals can be known. This survey would also
note the location of each chemical, the quantity at that
location, the state and security of the location, the
adjacent population density and location of vulnerable
facilities such as schools and hospitals.
The probability of exposure is determined according
to equation 3. The probability of exposure classes and
scoring are given in Table 7.
Table 3 Severity of hazard criteria and scoring of chemicals
Inhalational toxicity Flammability Reactivity
AEGL-3 or PAC-3 (mg/m3)
for 60 min exposure
Toxicity
score
NFPA flammability criteria* NFPA
score
NFPA reactivity criteria* NFPA
score
≤1 4 Flammable gas or cryogenic material 4 Materials with instantaneous power density
(IPD) of 1000 W/mL or greater @ 250°C;
sensitive to localized thermal or mechanical
shock at normal temperature and pressure
4
Liquid with flash point (FP) below
22.8°C and boiling point (BP) below 37°C
Materials that spontaneously ignite
when exposed to air
>1, ≤10 3 Liquids with FP below 22.8°C and BP at or
above 37.8°C; or FP at or above 22.8°C
and below 37.8°C
3 Materials with IPD at or above 100 W/mL
and below 1000 W/mL @ 250°C; sensitive
to thermal or mechanical shock at elevated
temperature and pressure
3
>10, ≤100 2 Liquids with FP at or above 37.8°C
and below 93.4°C
2 Materials with IPD at or above 10 W/mL and
below 100 W/mL @ 250°C
2
>100, ≤1000 1 Liquids, solids, semi-solids with FP
above 93.4°C
1 Materials with IPD at or above 0.01
W/mL and below 10 W/mL @ 250°C
1
>1000 0 If assigned 0 by NFPA 0 Materials with IPD below 0.01
W/mL @ 250°C
0
* See NFPA 704 for complete listing of criteria [30].
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Several risk matrices were considered [29] before the five
by five symmetrical matrix illustrated in Figure 1 was
chosen. This matrix which gave the required degree of
granularity was used to determine risk.Validation of the screening tool
Chemicals used to test the tool were from Tables 1 and 2,
the EU: List of Chemicals and Thresholds Seveso II
Directive [7,8], the United States: List of Chemicals
and Thresholds Risk Management Plan (RMP) Program
(Sec. 68.130) [9] and the US Department of Homeland
Security list [37]. The results of the testing are given in
Figure 2.
As expected HPV gases and high vapor pressure
liquids, that are highly toxic, flammable or reactive, are
ranked extreme risk (e.g., chlorine, hydrogen cyanide,
methane, fluorine). Highly toxic solids, that primarily
constitute an ingestion hazard, are ranked low to very low
risk (e.g., sodium azide, potassium cyanide). Chemical war-
fare agents, although extremely toxic, are ranked moderate
or low because of their low vapor pressure and difficulty in
synthesis (e.g., sarin). In addition to the chemicals shown in
Figure 2, the tool has been used to rank several hundred
chemicals of potential concern. The rankings are consistent
with those observed in previous studies [28,29,38].Table 4 Severity of hazard classes and scoring
Severity of hazard class
Severity of hazard scoring
(highest score received in one of the 3 hazard categories: flammability, toxiciDetailed instructions on using the tool are given
in Additional file 1: Guide to using CEWG tool to
determine risk.
The role of the public health community in the chemical
disaster management cycle
The chemical risk prioritization tool presented in the
previous sections allows for rapid screening of chemicals
of greatest public health concern. However, ultimately,
impacts and residual risk are situationally dependent.
When planning for accidental releases, several measures
such as conducting a survey of chemicals produced,
used, stored, disposed of and transported through the
area of concern combined with population data, allow
public health practitioners to estimate the quantity of
chemical that could be released and the number of
individuals that could potentially be exposed and their
duration of exposure. When planning for deliberate
releases, additional measures such as ease of importing
or producing an extremely hazardous chemical and
identification of locations where release of the chemical
could cause maximum harm must be considered. Ideally,
all factors collectively designed to reduce the likelihood
of a chemical release and to manage the release and
impacts, should be considered to determine residual
risks and assess vulnerabilities.
CEWG, in considering the role the public health
community could play in preventing chemical incidentsExtreme Major Significant Moderate Minor
4 3 2 1 0
ty, reactivity)
Table 5 Vapour pressure scoring
Vapour pressure
(kPa @ 20°C)
Vapour pressure
(mm Hg @ 20°C)
Score
gas or pressurized liquid gas or pressurized liquid 6
liquid, vp≥ 50 liquid, vp≥ 376 5
liquid, vp≥ 10, <50 liquid, vp≥ 75.2, <376 4
liquid/solid, vp≥ 1, <10 liquid/solid, vp≥ 7.52, <75.2 3
liquid/solid, vp≥ 0.1, <1 liquid/solid, vp≥ 0.752, <7.52 2
liquid/solid, vp <0.1 liquid/solid, vp <0.752 1
Table 7 Probability of exposure classes and scoring
Probability of
exposure class
Frequent Likely Occasional Seldom Unlikely
Probability of
exposure scoring
30-25 24-19 18-13 12-7 6-1
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exposed population and the environment, concluded
that the public health community has a vital role within
each of the five stages of the disaster management
cycle (prevention, emergency planning and preparedness,
detection and alert, response and recovery). The exact role
will depend on the jurisdiction (local, regional, national,
international) and the roles and capabilities of the other
partners (industry, labour, government, international
organizations) [5,6,39,40].
The first stage, prevention, focuses on reducing the
likelihood of a chemical incident occurring and using all
possible means (both organizational and technical) to
reduce the severity of the incident if it does occur and to
minimize its impact [5]. The public health community,
as a critical component of an integrated emergency
management structure, is essential in identifying hazard-
ous chemicals, determining all possible release scenarios
for these chemicals and assessing the health impact, both
immediate and long term, from these scenarios. This
includes determining the adequacy of data required for
health impact assessments [26] and proposing research to
fill critical data gaps. With respect to land use planning
regulations governing the location of chemical production,
use, storage and disposal sites and transportation infrastruc-
ture (ports, roads, rail lines, pipelines), the public health
community can support legislation to ensure that these
sites and corridors are located and built so as to minimize
the risks to human health, the environment and property if
a release occurs and can ensure that schools, hospitals and
other major health facilities are located outside of potential
hazard zones. The public health community can encourage
industry to improve plant and equipment design and to
replace hazardous chemicals and processes with lessTable 6 Criteria for determining the availability of chemicals
Availability criteria
High Production Volume chemical, few purchase restrictions, widely used an
Commercially Available, No (or few) purchase restrictions, widely used, minim
Commercially Available, major purchase Restrictions, limited use, tight securi
not commercially available, Chemical Synthesis easy, available precursors, sta
not commercially available, Chemical Synthesis Difficult (complex multistep),hazardous, but equally effective ones. Educating the public
to demand and use less hazardous chemicals and ensuring
that commonly used hazardous chemicals (e.g., pesticides
and cleaners) and their containers are clearly and appro-
priately marked indicating health hazards so that they are
not misused [5,41] are vital public health functions.
The second phase, emergency planning and prepared-
ness, ensures that the negative outcomes of a chemical
incident are minimized by responding to the emergency
in a timely, appropriate and integrated way. The public
health community can contribute to the design, set-up
and maintenance of effective emergency response infra-
structures with clearly defined roles and responsibilities
for each participating group and to the development of
chemical emergency plans covering detection, alert,
command and control, training and exercises, public
crisis communication and health sector communication.
It has the major responsibility in developing public
health incident response plans and ensuring that these
are integrated with the overall chemical emergency
plans. The public health community can also be influential
in the development and maintenance of databases, essential
for immediate response, including those for national
hazardous sites, chemical information and health sector
capabilities. At the local level, the public health community
can be responsible for conducting community impact
assessments for the hazardous sites located in the com-
munity or region, based on scenario studies of possible
releases, as identified in the national hazardous sites
database. Furthermore, the public health community is
essential in assessing the adequacy of existing medical
countermeasures for high risk chemicals, in recommending
research and development of new countermeasures where
required and in ensuring that existing countermeasures are
available for immediate use. The preparation of information
on chemical hazards and countermeasures that can be
taken in the event of a release and the communication of
this information to the public is a necessary public health
function. The public health community can contribute toand scoring
Availability score
d transported, minimum security (HPV) 5
um security (CAN) 4
ty (CAR) 3
ndard equipment (CS) 2
special equipment (CSD) 1
Risk Matrix 
Severity of 
Hazard (SH) 
Probability of Exposure (PE) 
Frequent  
(30-25)
Likely      
(24-19)
Occasional 
(18-13)
Seldom     
(12-7)
Unlikely      
(6-1) 
Extreme (4) EXTREME EXTREME EXTREME HIGH MODERATE
Major (3) EXTREME HIGH HIGH MODERATE LOW
Significant (2) EXTREME HIGH MODERATE LOW VERY LOW
Moderate (1) HIGH MODERATE LOW LOW VERY LOW
Minor (0) MODERATE LOW VERY LOW VERY LOW VERY LOW
Figure 1 Risk matrix.
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programs and exercises that are indispensible components
of preparedness and response to chemical incidents.
The third phase, incident detection and alert, is an
ongoing activity to determine that a chemical incident has
occurred and ensure the rapid alert required for a timely
and appropriate response. The public health community
can support the installation of detection and alarming
systems at hazardous sites and can take the lead in
developing and implementing methods that can assist
in the detection of less obvious chemical incidents.
These include training in the recognition of chemical
incidents for public health officials, medical professionals,
first responders and members of the community; theChemical
Inhalational 
toxicity AEGL-3 
or PAC-3 (60 
min) (mg/m3)#
NFPA 
score Principal hazard
SH 
score##
SH 
class###
Value Score F R
Chlorine 58 2 0 0 Ox
To
xi
ci
ty
 (T
)
2 SIG
Methyl isocyanate 0.47 4 3 2 W 4 EXT
Phosgene 3.1 3 0 1 3 MAJ
Sarin 0.13 4 1 4 EXT
VX 0.01 4 1 0 4 EXT
Methamidophos 8.1 3 3 MAJ
Parathion 2 3 1 3 MAJ
Sulfur mustard 2.1 3 1 0 3 MAJ
Potassium cyanide 40 2 0 0 2 SIG
Sodium carbonate 780* 1 1 MOD
Fluorine 20 2 0 4
R
ea
ct
iv
ity
 
(R
)
4 EXT
Tetraethyl lead 62.4* 2 2 3 3 MAJ
Ammonium nitrate 440* 1 0 3 Ox 3 MAJ
Sodium azide 32* 2 0 3 3 MAJ
Methane 11000 0 4 0
Fl
am
m
ab
ili
ty
 (F
) 4 EXT
Hydrogen cyanide 17 2 4 2 4 EXT
Ethylene oxide 360 1 4 3 4 EXT
Carbon monoxide 380 1 4 0 4 EXT
Phosphine 5.1 3 4 2 4 EXT
Hydrogen sulphide 71 2 4 0 4 EXT
Methanol 9400 0 3 0 3 MAJ
Ammonia 769 1 1 0 T F 1 MOD
Iron pentacarbonyl 1.4 3 3 1 T F 3 MAJ
Chloropicrin 9.4 3 0 3 T R 3 MAJ
Severity of Hazard (SH) is determined from equation 2 and Tables 3 &4; Probability of Exposure (P
W = water; Ox = oxidizer; EXT = extreme; MAJ = major; ; MOD = moderate; SIG = significant; M
HIG = high; V Low = very low: CAN = commercially available no restrictions; CS = chemical synt
see Table 5; ^ see Table 6; ^^ from eqn 3; *** see Tab
Figure 2 Example showing determination of risk for chemicals releasprovision of a well publicized phone number and/or Inter-
net connection to report incidents to the appropriate
authorities; the establishment and maintenance of a routine
population health surveillance program and environmental
monitoring system and the implementation of an alert
channel to rapidly mobilize required personnel.
The first step in the fourth phase, response, is
termination of the release followed by preventing
the spread of contamination and reducing exposure.
Although the public health community is not normally
involved in the termination of atmospheric releases, it
has an important role in reducing the spread of con-
tamination including the rapid assessment of incident
control options, assessing the need for decontaminationPhysical 
state 
(200C)
Vapor 
pressure 
(kPa @ 
200C) 
Vapor 
pressure 
score**
Avail Avail 
score^
PE 
score^^
PE 
class*** RISK
+
gas 6 HPV 5 30 FRE EXT
liquid 54 5 HPV 5 25 FRE EXT
gas 6 HPV 5 30 FRE EXT
liquid 0.27 2 CSD 1 2 UNL MOD
liquid 0.00009 1 CSD 1 1 UNL MOD
solid 0.000002 1 HPV 5 5 UNL LOW
liquid 0.000005 1 HPV 5 5 UNL LOW
liquid 0.0096 1 CS 2 2 UNL LOW
solid 1 HPV 5 5 UNL V LOW
solid 1 HPV 5 5 UNL V LOW
gas 6 HPV 5 30 FRE EXT
liquid 0.027 1 HPV 5 5 UNL LOW
solid 1 HPV 5 5 UNL LOW
solid 1 CAN 4 4 UNL LOW
gas 6 HPV 5 30 FRE EXT
liquid 82.6 5 HPV 5 25 FRE EXT
gas 6 HPV 5 30 FRE EXT
gas 6 HPV 5 30 FRE EXT
gas 6 CAN 4 24 LIK EXT
gas 6 HPV 5 30 FRE EXT
liquid 12.3 4 HPV 5 20 LIK HIG
gas 6 HPV 5 30 FRE HIG
liquid 4.7 @25 3 HPV 5 15 OCC HIG
liquid 2.7 3 CAN 4 12 SEL MOD
E) from equation 3 and Tables 5, 6 &7; Risk from Figure 1;Avail = availability; *PAC-3 value; 
IN = minor; FRE = frequent; LIK = likely; OCC = occasional; SEL = seldom; UNL = unlikely; 
hesis; CSD = difficult chemical synthesis; ** see Table 3; ## from eqn 2; ### see Table 4;  ** 
le 7; + see Fig 1; italic = chemical warfare agents
ed into the atmosphere.
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http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/13/253of exposed persons, ensuring that contaminated persons
do not leave the hazard zone prior to decontamination and
advising on personal protection equipment and measures.
The public health community also functions in assessing
possible immediate and long term health effects so that
appropriate responses can be determined. In the case of
large airborne releases the public health assessment is a
critical factor in deciding between the options of sheltering-
in-place and evacuation. During the incident, the public
health community acts to disseminate essential informa-
tion and advice to responders, the public, and the media.
This information must be consistent, tailored to the needs
of the particular group and be simple, timely, accurate,
relevant and credible (STARC). Conducting investiga-
tions that assess effects on health or on the environment
during an incident so as to offer the best possible advice
on treatment and protection throughout the incident,
registering potentially affected individuals as soon as
possible following a chemical release and conductingTable 8 The role the public health community can play in the
Prevention Emergency planning and
preparedness
Detection and
▪ Identifying chemical
hazards
▪ Contributing to the design,
set-up & maintenance of
effective emergency
response infrastructures
▪ Supporting in
of chemical det
& alarm system
▪ Conducting risk
assessment
▪ Contributing to the
development of integrated
chemical emergency plans
▪ Establishing m
to detect & rep
chemical incide
▪ Determining health
impact of all potential
release scenarios
▪ Developing public health
chemical incident response
plans
▪ Developing c
incident recogn
training
▪ Communicating data
on chemical hazards to
the general public
▪ Supporting the development
of relevant databases
▪ Developing d
technologies fo
chemical expos
▪ Supporting land use
planning regulations
▪ Preparing information on
chemical hazards &
countermeasures and
communicating this
information to the public
▪ Providing pho
Internet connec
to report incide
▪ Supporting reduction
in quantities of
chemicals stored
▪ Maintaining an inventory
of existing medical
countermeasures
▪ Developing
population hea
& environment
surveillance sys
▪ Supporting product
substitution
▪ Developing improved
medical countermeasures
▪ Developing in
alert systems
▪ Supporting improved
plant & equipment design
▪ Developing training
programs
▪ Supporting increased
security at chemical
transport and storage
facilities
▪ Planning and participating
in chemical incident exercises
▪ Supporting law
enforcement and
intelligenceepidemiological investigations are other important public
health functions.
The fifth and final stage, recovery, includes clean-up,
health monitoring, evaluation and other activities that are
aimed at restoring the community or site to an acceptable
condition and contributing to prevention of a recurrence.
The public health community has a vital role in organizing
health care, including mental health care, to treat victims
and support them in regaining control of their lives. De-
pending on the incident, care and support may be required
for many years. Conducting risk and health outcome
assessments, including exposure, environmental and
human health assessments, implementing remediation and
restoration actions, collecting and compiling epidemio-
logical data and tabulating and disseminating lessons
learned are other important functions the public health
community can undertake in the recovery stage.
Table 8 summarizes the role public health can play in
the disaster management cycle.chemical disaster management cycle
alert Response Recovery
stallation
ection
s
▪ Activating the public
health aspects of the
incident management
system
▪ Organizing health care,
including mental health care, to
treat victims & to support them
throughout the recovery cycle
ethods
ort covert
nts
▪ Making rapid assessments
of incident control options
▪ Undertaking risk & health
outcome assessments
hemical
ition
▪ Advising and alerting
health care services
▪ Implementing remediation
and restoration actions
iagnostic
r
ures
▪ Ensuring coordination
& integration of public
health response
▪ Collecting and compiling
epidemiological data
ne and
tions
nts
▪ Conducting a best
outcome assessment
for both immediate &
long-term actions.
▪ Evaluating emergency
response
lth
al
tems
▪ Disseminating
information and advice
to responders, the public
& the media
▪ Tabulating and disseminating
lessons learned
cident ▪ Registering all exposed
individuals & collecting
samples to estimate
exposure
▪ Conducting
epidemiological
investigations
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A flexible screening tool for chemicals that present a risk
when released into the atmosphere has been developed.
Risk, determined using this screening tool, is general,
independent of site, situation and scenario, applicable to
accidental and deliberate releases into the atmosphere and
takes all chemical hazards (toxicity, flammability, reactivity)
into consideration. The tool is semi-quantitative and can
be easily and quickly implemented by non-subject matter
experts using freely available authoritative information.
The role that the public health community can play in
the chemical disaster management cycle is described.
Additional file
Additional file 1: “Guide to using the CEWG chemical risk screening
tool 23_01_2013.pdf”. The guide contains detailed instructions on the
use of the CEWG tool to determine the risk posed by chemicals released
into the atmosphere.
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